Theoretical studies of bank existence reveal the importance of informational asymmetries (cf., for example, Diamond (1984) ). This might suggest that banks specialise their loan origination in specific industries to exploit information advantages. However, modern portfolio theory, although not directly applicable to banks, as well as the concept of herding behaviour would instead tend to imply that banks' loan portfolios should mimic the industry composition of the total loan market.
Introduction
Modern portfolio theory is mainly about finding optimal risk/return tradeoffs for (financial) assets. Banks are one major player in financial markets, distinguished through their ability to originate and manage loans. The loan portfolio also forms a significant part of their whole portfolio. Unfortunately, loan portfolio adjustments can not happen instantaneously, like in most other asset categories. This is due to market frictions such as transaction costs and the illiquidity of loans arising, e.g., from informational asymmetries between lender and borrower. The loan portfolio structure can be adjusted when loans determine and/or are originated. Loan sales and other methods of securitisation (ABS, Credit Derivatives, etc.) which become more and more popular, will increase the possible adjustment pace. However, the aim of this first analysis is to find out whether banks prefer specialisation of loan origination in just a few industries or market-orientation, i.e. investing in all industry segments according to their market share, leaving loan sales and other securitisation methods for future studies.
Arguments favouring loan portfolio risk concentration are mainly based on loan market frictions such as asymmetric information. When a bank specialises its loan portfolio structure, for example, it does not always have to spend new resources to analyse the particular industry. Arguments favouring market adjustment are inspired by the notions of diversification (cf. Markowitz (1952) ) and two-fund separation (cf. Tobin (1958) ) in portfolio theory. Universal separation, all market participants hold the same structure of the risky part of their portfolio, might be observable for the loan segment in reality although market frictions and other violated assumptions imply that such theoretical results need not to hold. Except from equilibrium models, arguments favouring market-orientation can be obtained because portfolio managers might believe more in aggregated information (which is signalled by the market development) than in their own risk assessment. Which portfolio strategy banks are actually following is relevant for quite different parties, banks as well as loan portfolio managers, regulators and investors. They all have to assess and partly steer the composition of this part of their portfolio. From a behavioural finance perspective, they may prefer to run with the herd rather than betting on their individual view.
In order to cope with the raised question we will conduct a purely explanatory and descriptive empirical analysis. Methodologically, examination of German banks' loan portfolio adjustment processes is based on our several static distance measures which all abstract from any kind of risk or return specification. These measures are only based on the individual loan portfolio compositions and therefore do not belong to the context (µσ-space) in which the theoretical result of universal separation can be obtained. In our opinion distance measures come with two important advantages. Firstly, we do not have to restrict our analysis to a particular risk/return specification especially since it is far from clear which risk measure is appropriate to quantify loan default risk. To assume, for example, that σ would be an adequate risk measure is rather utopic since nearly all loan return distributions are highly skewed. Secondly, the defined distance measures can easily be calculated and no additional data (except the portfolio compositions) has to be collected. This is important since the loan market lacks of reliable and sufficient data, such as returns and (default) correlations.
Analysing banks' loan portfolio composition might not reveal their intention unconcealed since the outstanding loan volumes (and therefore their composition) result, among others, from an interplay between supply and demand as well as global economic development. Therefore, obviously further research is needed and our empirical analysis is just a first attempt.
Anyway our methodology of distance measures produces some interesting results based on the examination of loan data aggregated across bank groups at this stage already and thereby encourages more inquiries in this field. We find, for example, that
• all analysed bank categories seem to intend market adjustment for their illiquid (loan) portfolio, • market-orientation is observable in most industries, while, for example, the agricultural, hunting and forestry industry is "biased" towards cooperative banks, • the role of the central bank is different for banks under public law compared to cooperative banks.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four parts. Section 2 illustrates our methodology. Section 3 describes the analysed data, while Section 4 summarises our empirical findings. Conclusions and a research outlook are provided at the end.
Methodology

Preliminary Considerations
Testing for market-orientation or specialisation, we would have to check whether every single financial contract, in particular every loan contract, is shared by all investors. Apparently size restrictions combined with imperfect divisibility and transaction costs are such that nobody would expect marketorientation to appear as perfect as in results from theoretical predictions like therefore not equivalent to the fact that, for example, this portfolio lies closer to the µσ-efficiency frontier than an other one.
universal separation anyway; although, we should add, the creation of asset backed securities (ABS) and other credit securitisation measures might mitigate some of these distortions in the long-run since they allow to share relatively small loan contracts (e.g. credit card loans and other consumer loans) via pooling by a large number of investors.
Anyway, the next best to think of is to reduce the number of assets by treating loan contracts with equal characteristics and perfect correlation as being identical. We think that this will not take us very far either. Concentrating on corporate loans, it is in fact usually for the small companies for which little information, if any, is available to calculate meaningful and reliable correlations. Identifying firms which are quasi-identical with respect to their credit risk is therefore not really an option. This is also true because there still is considerable difference in the profession what type of correlation should be measured in the first place (cf. Saunders (1999) and Ong (1999) ). As empirical tests show, the correlation of defaults may be very different from the correlation of rating changes and of asset values where these are available (cf. Wahrenburg and Niethen (2000) ).
Since the aggregation of perfectly correlated assets into one is not possible either, we need to be still more crude in our analysis. Aggregating across industries is probably the most natural third-best choice. At present, however, we are not claiming that it is indeed to be preferred over all conceivable alternatives. In particular the large corporations this time are likely to cause problems. Although there seems to be the tendency that conglomerates are being pushed to concentrate on core competencies (cf. Verdin and Williamson (1994) ), they generally do not confirm to the convenient but unrealistic picture of being single-output firms. Thus, any assignment of a corporation to one specific industry in order to use the resulting classification as a proxy for the real correlation structure will be flawed to some extent. This will in general still hold if we try to be more sophisticated by assigning corporations to more than one industry, e.g. using the revenue shares of their lines of business to determine the relative sizes of the then artificial single-output firms. As an alternative, we could also categorise the loans according to company size, geographical location or other seemingly reasonable criteria.
2
Despite of all limitations, we will use banks' loan portfolio data on the industry level to demonstrate the construction of reasonable measures which can be used to describe the homogeneity or heterogeneity of loan portfolios. Further on, time series of these measures are the foundation of our empirical analysis. Since we have been quite pessimistic with respect to the legitimacy of this approach so far, some remarks are in order. Firstly, we should note that undisputable values for the default correlation structures we ultimately would want to use are not only unavailable to us, but also to any portfolio manager. He or she can (and often has to) make a choice and work with estimated correlations, although not feeling perfectly comfortable.
3 However, an obvious choice, which could have the advantage of being fairly robust because outliers should average out, might be the correlation between industries, but this approach has not yet been examined in-depth and would also neglect all firm-specific information. Secondly, it is known from portfolio theory that in the presence of limited data a naive diversification (i.e. investing equal percentages of allocated funds in each asset) has at least some merit (cf. Bodie et al. (1999) , pp. 240). Regarding asset allocation by banks over the loan market portfolio in an economy, we think that it is not totally unreasonable to assume that the industry composition of the loan market portfolio will be regarded as a superior reference point for a quasi-naive diversification in the absence of better data. The economy wide composition is publicly available (cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (2001)), and keeping the own loan portfolio close to its structure also has the potential to protect managers from complaints about holding unjustified concentration risk. In a nutshell, we think that comparing industry shares in loan portfolios, with the economy's loan market portfolio as the benchmark, is a sensible first step to a more advanced measurement of loan portfolio similarity. It is a defensible starting point, abstracting from further complications that will show up in the further course of our study, for a test of the market-orientation separation hypothesis in the credit business.
Basic Axioms
Before we are able to compare different loan portfolios and, in particular, the distance of their compositions, we have to define what we mean by such distances. Let X b,t = (X 
We want to measure how different the loan portfolios are with respect to their industry compositions. We may do this by measuring the distance between two (normalised) vectors. Our approach and the first properties demanded should therefore not come as a surprise. We will denote a distance 3 As Zhou (1997) mentioned, the evaluation of default correlations is a difficult task, since they cannot be measured directly. Either a theoretical default model has to be assumed for the estimation, or historical data have to be chosen. The first alternative is not promising, because a satisfactory default model does not yet exist. The second alternative has the disadvantage of not capturing any firmspecific information. Additionally, because of the lack of reliable time series data, the estimates based on the available data are generally very inaccurate. 4 For convenience we will drop the superscripts most of the time where this is possible without creating confusion. 
Axiom 2 Symmetry
A function D with these two properties is called a quasi-metric. For D to be a metric it would also have to satisfy the triangular inequality (x, z) . This property does not seem to have an immediate interpretation in our context and hence we do not require this property here. However, we also see no reason not to require this property either and so some of our measures, e.g. the Euclidean distance, will have it.
The last axiom which we require in this first approach to analyse banks' loan portfolio structures is:
whereD < ∞ represents the upper limit of the distance measure D.
The reader might has already realised that we do not require from our distance measures D(x, y) that they are independent of other banks' loan portfolio compositions. This is done since we do not want to exclude such market portfolio based risk measures, where, for example, the differences in each portfolio category are weighted with the market share of this class, as 
Distance Measures
In order to quantify the distances between different portfolio compositions without taking any further information into account, we suggest the following six measures, each of them having several advantages and disadvantages, some of them being described below. 5 Strictly speaking, we could replace IR n + by the unit simplex because the industry shares add up to 1. 6 When distance measures based on relative differences are considered, i.e. whenever (x i + y i ) appears in the denominator, the disparity in unoccupied portfolio classes
Measure 1 Maximum Absolute Difference
Measure 2 Normalised Sum of Absolute Differences
Measure 3 Normalised Sum of Squared Differences
Measure 4 Maximum Relative Difference
Measure 5 Average Relative Difference
Measure 6 Average Squared Relative Difference
Before we start analysing the given data, it is important to realise some properties of our distance measures, except the fact that they satisfy the three axioms presented above. The reader has probably seen some of those distance measures before, but we still want to make some comments about them. D 1 just gives the maximum absolute difference (|x i − y i |) between portfolio x and portfolio y in one industry segment. It is therefore insensitive with respect to the portfolio composition in all industries but the one with the biggest absolute difference. D 2 is a variant of the arithmetic mean of these differences across all industries transformed by multiplication with n 2 . It tells us the proportion of portfolio x which has to be rearranged in order to (x i = 0 and y i = 0) is set equal to zero to avoid division by zero. 7 By relative differences we mean those that are calculated in relation to x i + y i . More precisely we would have to call them relative absolute differences because, at least for D 4 and D 5 we have the absolute value of the difference in the numerator. achieve portfolio structure y or vice versa. The (also slightly transformed) second moment of the absolute differences, D 3 , allows that two portfolios with, e.g., a big difference in one industries are considered "further apart" than two with a few small differences. ) and then realise that
Hence we are prepared to state that in this example D 3 better matches the intuition than both D 1 and D 2 .
Measures D 4 to D 6 represent similar (untransformed) measures based on relative differences
. These measures have the property that they value a 1%-divergence in one industry between 99% and 98% less severe than between 2% and 1%. The divergence in each portfolio class is put into perspective of the whole proportional investment in this class. However, these measures also have a disadvantage when not all industries are relevant. They value the absolute difference between 0% and 1% similar to the difference between 0% and 100%, when we neglect the other portfolio classes for a moment.
9 Even more importantly, whenever x i > 0 and y i = 0 for some industry i, we will have D 4 equal to one, irrespective of all other industries. And each industry with this property (resp. x i = 0 and y i > 0) will contribute 1 n to the values of D 5 and D 6 . Fortunately, this possible critique of distance measures based on relative differences is not relevant in our case, since all bank groups we will examine in the following section hold loans to all industries which are taken into account throughout the whole sample period.
Data
The analysed annual data, covering June 1970 to June 2001, is part of the banking statistic, which is published as a part of the monthly reports of the German Central Bank about the current financial and economic situation in Germany. The table summarising the data is entitled, "lending to domestic enterprises and self employed persons". It consists of outstanding loan volumes, excluding holdings of negotiable money market papers and securities, sorted by industry of economic activity and banks' category.
All banks we will analyse can be assigned to one of the following categories: (i) commercial banks, (ii) banks under public law, (iii) cooperative banks or (iv) other banks.
10 In all considered industries all bank categories and all bank groups they consist of, possess a non-neglegible market share so that the above mentioned difficulties with distance measures based on relative differences will not arise. Unfortunately, the industry structure on which the tables in the reports are based changes several times. In order to cope with these structural breaks we only examine industries which exist during the whole sample period. The industries examined during the whole sample period from 1970-2001 are: (i) electricity, gas and water supply, (ii) wholesale and retail trade, (iii) transport, storage, and communication, (iv) service industry, (v) construction, (vi) agriculture, hunting, and forestry, (vii) financial institutions, and insurance, (viii) manufacturing. Since 1970, as can be seen from Table 1 where the structure of the whole analysed portfolio, often referred to as the loan market portfolio, is stated, the manufacturing industry unites a significant market share. Therefore, data exist to split up this industry from 1970 onwards into 9 sub industries.
11 When working with this finer industry categorisation we refer to them as "many industries" in comparison to the more aggregated categorisation ("few industries"). Because an equivalent split-up possibility does not exist for the service industries, which experienced size changes opposite to the manufacturing industry development, before 1989, we treat manufacturing and service industry once symmetrically ("few industry") and once asymmetrically ("many industry"). Table 1 presents an overview of the loan market portfolio's structural development, which will serve as a benchmark when testing for market-orientation or specialisation. As already mentioned many structural changes in our data occur but we only have indicated the two most relevant ones. Between June 1980 and 1981 the German Central Bank (slightly) reorganised its industries classification causing unusually large distortion for cooperative banks.
12 For example, the total proportional engagement in the service industry increases (abruptly) by more than 12 percentage points in one year while cooperative banks' engagement in this industry increases negligible from 23.74% to 10 The category "commercial banks" consists of the leading big banks, as well as regional banks and other commercial banks including private bankers, and finally branches of foreign banks. The category "banks under public law" contains state banks and savings banks. The category "cooperative banks" includes regional institutions of credit cooperatives as well as the credit cooperatives themselves. The category "other banks" is not analysed in more detail since it consists of very heterogeneous groups including, for example, mortgage banks and banks with special functions. 11 These sub industries are: (i) chemical industry, coke and petroleum, (ii) rubber and plastic, (iii) other non-metallic mineral products, (iv) basic and fabricated metal products, (v) machinery and equipment of vehicles, (vi) electronic and optical equipment, (vii) wood and paper products, (viii) textile, (ix) food and tobacco. 12 For a detailed description see Deutsche Bundesbank (1981) , the explanations to the relevant Tables on p. 62 and 70. 24.76%. The other break indicated is due to the German reunification. From July 1990 onwards the German Central Bank summarises former East and West German banks in their statistics. Additionally, the currency in which the outstanding loan volumes are quoted changes from DM to ¿, but this does not cause any difficulties for our analysis. For the moment we will ignore further breaks. They do not exhibit extraordinary impacts on the aggregated annual data. We also refrain in the meantime from rigorous statistical tests for breaks. How we handle breaks will become clear when appropriate.
To get an idea about the relevance of our analysed loan portfolio for trying to asses banks' portfolio strategy, it is helpful to inspect the relation between the analysed portfolio and a portfolio consisting not only of loans but also including bonds and shares. 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 W h o le P o r t f o lio C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B a n k s u . p . L a w C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s
As is obvious from Figure 1 , the analysed portfolio accounts for approximately 50% of all bank lending (loans as well as advances not evidenced by certificates) to non-banks. Slight deviations can be found when analysing the relevant bank categories individually. The significance of the structural breaks mentioned above is also present in this figure. Similar relations are obtained when standardising the analysed portfolio by (i) balance sheet total (tending around 25-30%), (ii) total lending (loans, shares, bonds) to banks as well as non-banks (tending also around 25-30%) or finally (iii) lending (loans, shares, bonds) to non-banks only (40-50%).
Before starting our analysis, it is necessary to be aware of which bank categories or sub-categories form the market portfolio, cf. 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B a n k s u . p . L a w C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s O t h e r B a n k s
Obviously, there is some change in the market shares of bank categories. Yet the categories' internal structure, not shown explicitly in this paper, is astonishingly time invariant. For commercial banks the largest sub category regional banks and others accounts constantly for about 48%. The remaining 52% belong to the sub categories big banks (44%) and branches of foreign banks (8%). The only significant distortion occurs 1999 through a change in the central bank's categorisation due to the merger of two regional banks ("Bayerische Hypotheken-und Wechselbank" & "Bayerische Vereinsbank") forming one big bank ("HypoVereinsbank"). Thereby, big banks' share rises to about 62% while the share of regional banks decreases equivalently. For banks under public law approximately 60% belong to savings banks and the remaining 40% belong to state banks. More dispersedly is the cooperative banks' internal division. Credit cooperatives account for more than 80%, while the remaining part belongs to regional institutions.
One of the most obvious difficulties of our study is that we use aggregate instead of individual bank loan data. However, we think that this is not only a problem but also provides new opportunities. Of course, it is problematic to gain insight about individual bank behaviour when analysing aggregate data since one can not distinguish the case where two banks specialise their holdings in such a way that they "compensate" each other from the case that they are both market-orientated. But working with aggregate data has not only the advantage that they are relatively easy to obtain in order to illustrate our new methodology, distance measures, they also enable us to examine different bank categories/ sub-categories which would be difficult otherwise since the reported industry segmentation is often different from bank to bank.
13 Using aggregate data, e.g. questions about the general role of central banks, such as state banks and regional institutions of credit cooperatives, can be tackled. In addition, when changing the perspective from comparing banks' portfolio composition with the market composition to examining how each industries is actually served by bank categories/ sub-categories, we may find indications, e.g. whether banks under public law are still necessary for an adequate credit supply in the whole economy.
Empirical Results
Portfolio Analysis (Bank Categories)
This section presents a selection of our empirical findings for bank categories based on (loan market) distance measures' time series plots and the underlying figures. Extra information is provided when necessary. Only movements over the whole sample are analysed, not considering tendencies in particular time intervals (e.g. post reunification). This is of course debatable, but in this first analysis we want to focus on long-run movements.
As can be seen from Figures 3 (many industries) and A.1 (few industries), according to D 6 all three bank categories reduce their loan portfolios' distance to the market, i.e. they seem to prefer market-orientation to portfolio specialisation. Unfortunately, we can not prove that this is driven by banks' portfolio managers' intention. We believe that of course the global economic development and the perceived outlook of particular industries play a crucial role in determining the observed (and analysed) outstanding loan volumes. But they also depend significantly on the particular loan conditions offered by the bank (indicating also portfolio managers' objectives).
The tendency (approaching the loan market) seems to be most present for cooperative and commercial banks, while banks under public law already "nearly" possess the market structure in comparison to the other categories. 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B a n k s u . p . L a w C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s
In order to put this finding in a wider perspective Table 2 (many industries) and Table A .1 (few industries) respectively report a short summary (start/ end points, averages) of the other distance measures' time series. Except that Table 2 and Table A .1 just give a quick shot of our findings, three results become obvious already. (i) All analysed bank categories decrease their distance to the loan market during the sample horizon according to all six measures except for D 1 of cooperative banks. (ii) Banks under public law are according to all six measures over the whole horizon (which is not totally obvious from the stated results) closest to the loan market. This might influence their intention and possibility to reduce their distance, since they can not reduce their distance by absolute amounts like the other categories because their own distance is much lower from the start. (iii) The industry categorisation change does not destroy the validity of the stated results, even three whole distance measures' time series among some other findings remain unchanged (D 1 for cooperative banks as well as D 4 for commercial and cooper-ative banks). That non of these findings can be explained through the market shares' development during the sample horizon, is obvious from Figure 2 . No category's market share increases appropriately to explain these tendencies. Additionally, banks under public law do not possess a market share which is so high that their industry composition of the loan portfolio necessarily dominates the market.
In order to analyse the distance measures' time series more deeply, Table 3 (many industries) and Table A .2 (few industries) respectively report further summary statistics of the series. To aggregate the information of the distance measures' time series and make them partly comparable across different measures (they are already comparable across bank categories) we propose a coefficient γ standing for the percentage increase or decrease over the whole sample horizon according to the fitted values of an OLS-regression,ŷ (γ =ŷ 1970 ). The OLS-regression tries to capture the tendency in the time series. Therefore, this coefficient has two important advantages. Firstly, this coefficient, unlike the percentage development based on the original values, is quite independent of the selected start and end points of the sample range. Secondly, the coefficient is not level dependent like the simple slope coefficient of the OLSregression.
14 R 2 reports the goodness of the fit of this linear regression. The Spearman-rank correlation coefficient (see, for example, Zar (1972) ) with time, RC, is calculated in order to check for monotone but non-linear tendencies. = Development over whole sample in percentage according to regression; RC = Rank correlation coefficient (with distance-to-date)
The reported statistical measures are calculated for the whole sample horizon. When excluding structural breaks (80/81, 90/91) with an appropriate time window (80-83; 90-92) , at most small improvements such as slight increases in R 2 and/or RC can be obtained. Since these minor changes differ across measures and bank categories, we decided to work with the whole set. Otherwise for each measure and bank category combination (as will be obvious when comparing arbitrary distance measures' time series plots) other appropriate time-window constellations would have to be determined and applied.
The results stated in Table 3 and Table A .2 are examined throughout the remainder of this section. In both tables the γ-value for banks under public law and the measure D 3 is printed in italics indicating a distance decrease of more than 100%. This is of course impossible and results from the application of the regression instead of the original values, where we would get γ From what is stated above it is obvious that the defined distance measures do not only have different properties but also react with different sensitivity to changes in the analysed bank categorisation as well as the underlying industry differentiation. Therefore, we propose a three-step-procedure in order to analyse banks' loan portfolio composition with the help of the defined measures. The first two steps deal with the fine industry categorisation, which is chosen arbitrary.
Comparison of distance measures which are based on same difference type (absolute or relative) but have a different structure
In this first step time series' plots of the defined (static) distance measures are examined. These plots should be analysed individually before comparing them with measures based on the same differences but different structure 
Comparison of distance measures which are based on different difference types (absolute vs. relative) but have an identical structure
The aim of the second step is to figure out which of the previous findings depend on the absolute industry size. It is often the case that the analysed industry segments are of very different size. A comparison of the measures based on absolute differences with their relative counterparts helps to alleviate this problem.
Sensitivity analysis
This step tries to check whether some of the findings result, for example, from (i) the industry differentiation or from (ii) the considered banks (categories or sub-categories). When these determinants are changed it has to be focused on the effects for possible crossing and starting properties of the time series plots as well as the emergence of temporary distortions in an otherwise nearly constant tendency. This step often helps to explain findings which seem to be confusing at first glance.
Step 1: When examining the reported summary statistics in Table 3 , it is obvious that the portfolios of all three analysed bank categories exhibit a tendency towards market-orientation (γ < 0), except for D 1 in the case of cooperative banks, as we found earlier already in Table 2. Market-orientation is, for example, quite visible when comparing D 2 for all analysed categories in June 1970 and June 2001, showing a sharp decrease in the portfolio proportion which has to be reorganised in order to obtain the market portfolio structure (cf. A few other things become obvious for measures based on absolute differences (many industries): (i) The comparison of time tends (γ) across bank categories indicates that banks under public law possess a stronger intention for market-orientation than the other two categories (γ Step 2: Comparing the summary statistics of measures based on absolute differences with measures based on relative differences suggests that commercial banks as well as banks under public law seem to be more concerned about their absolute difference based distance measures than their relative counter parts (γ One of the disadvantages of our methodology is that we can hardly say something about banks' intention which might not only be influenced by diversification issues. For example, especially for cooperative banks historical issues as well as loan size might also be relevant. However, since our measures are quite transparent they help to discover possible causes of this (at first glance) distorting result. In this particular case it turns out that from 1981 onwards the service industry is reliable for D 1 of cooperative banks to increase. After the German Central Bank reorganised the industry classification in 1980, causing unusually severe distortions in the data, cooperative banks never caught up with the development in this industry.
15 Since the loan volume in the service industry is growing rapidly this shortfall only biases D 1 and not D 4 .
Step 3: When conducting a sensitivity analysis or robustness check to figure out which of the presented results depend, for example, on the chosen industry categorisation, we have to examine which kind of changes occur when switching from many to few industries. Some results will be independent of this switch, while others may lose validity, most obvious when focusing on (i) starting and crossing properties of the time series as well as (ii) extreme distortions. The comparison has to be done carefully, since starting and crossing properties similar to distortions do not only depend on the industry categorisation but also on the analysed distance measure and bank category. In order to identify some of these switch-caused changes, compare the maximum of the absolute differences in Figure 4 (many industries) and Figure 5 (few industries). As is obvious, starting and crossing properties change (compare also Table 5 ). Strong distortions e.g. appear in 90-93 for banks under public law and disappear in 92-94 for commercial banks. 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B a n k s u . p . L a w C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s
That the manufacturing industry split-up can, but of course does not have to, influence the findings becomes clear from 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B a n k s u . p . L a w C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s
It is also tempting to think that in June 2001 commercial and cooperative banks are at opposing sides in the service industry, one less and the other one with a more than proportional engagement. However, this is not true. Both of them have a less than proportional share compensating the more than proportional engagements of the category other banks. It looks, on the one hand, as if our results were quite sensitive w.r.t the sector categorisation. As described the analysed switch from many to few sectors caused changes in starting and crossing properties of distance measures' time series and influenced extreme "distortions". In particular, three of our observations cease to be valid (cf. . On the other hand, the caused changes leave the general trends (compare Table 3 with Table A of distances, and, therefore, their numerical results are not affected by this switch. In other words, a finer categorisation of the manufacturing industry even leaves some distance measures unchanged only considering one particular industry, and more can not be expected at all. Therefore, we still believe that the presented results strongly support, on an highly aggregated level, the market-orientation hypothesis.
Industry Analysis (Bank Categories)
In order to realise one of the biggest advantages of working with aggregated data, we change the perspective. Until now the loan portfolios of bank categories were compared with the loan market structure trying to identify adjustments. In this section, the actual industry division (between all (four) relevant bank categories to capture the whole market) is compared with a hypothetical division, assuming that each bank category holds a industry proportion according to its market share (market-orientation hypothesis). This is again done by calculating all six proposed distance measures (actual vs. hypothetical division). For this analysis we decided to stick to bank categories since then there is no need to model how different sub categories interact. When trying to examine whether each category is necessary for an adequate credit supply in each industry, issues arising, for example, from the problem of treating savings and state banks as well as credit cooperatives and their regional institutions separately are thereby neglected. Also we will work with the broad industry categorisation (few industries) for simplicity. Some of our findings are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 . 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Elec tric ity, G as and W ater S up p ly C o ns truc tio n W ho les ale and R etail T rad e Agric ulture, Hunting and F o res try T rans p o rt, S to rage and C o m munic atio n F inanc ial Ins titutio ns and Ins uranc e S ervic e Ind us try M anufac turing
We choose to present these two figures, since we have analysed D 1 and D 6 in the previous section as well and they show clearly that an interpretation of distance measures in this context becomes more difficult than before. However, both figures presented have two things in common. Firstly, the movement of the distance measures' time series plots seems to be much more erratic than the series obtained comparing bank portfolio compositions with the loan market structure. Secondly, however, mainly three industries seemingly contradicting the market-orientation hypothesis can be identified, since their distance between the actual and the hypothetical industry division is quite large independent of the applied measure. These industries will, therefore, be examined more carefully. The three industries are (identified by visual inspection of Figures 6 and 7): (i) agriculture, hunting and forestry; (ii) transport, storage and communication; (iii) electricity, gas and water supply. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Elec tric ity, G as and W ater S up p ly C o ns truc tio n W ho les ale and R etail T rad e Agric ulture, Hunting and F o res try T rans p o rt, S to rage and C o mm unic atio n F inanc ial Ins titutio ns and Ins uranc e S ervic e Ind us try M anufac turing
To examine these industries in more detail the relation between the actual industry share and the hypothetical share for each bank category is calculated and plotted against time (cf. Figures 8, 9, 10 ). When bank categories follow, as suggested previously, the market-orientation strategy this relation should tend towards 1. If the relation for one bank category is larger (smaller) than one, their industry engagement is more (less) than proportional in relation to its total market share. Since portfolio proportions of each bank category add up to 1, two facts have to be true when examining the relation between the actual industry share and the hypothetical share. Firstly, if one bank category has a value greater than one in one industry it has to have a value less than one some other industry. Secondly, this argument also applies within an industry. If one bank category possesses a value greater than one in this particular industry, this has to be compensated by some other bank category through a value below one. 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B a n k s u . p . L a w C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s O t h e r B a n k s Figure 8 shows that the industry share of cooperative banks in agriculture, hunting and forestry was always above their share of the loan market and is rising from 1981 onwards. This might be due to the Raiffeisenbanken, which are a subgroup of cooperative banks. They were founded to support the rural communities, and might still be sticking to their original roots, even though this contradicts the market-orientation hypothesis. It could simply be the case that their market share (and hence of the whole group) is systematically higher in regions where agriculture, hunting and forestry are particularly important. 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B a n k s u . p . L a w C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s O t h e r B a n k s
The transport, storage and communication industry is visibly biased (cf. Figure 9 ) only by the category other banks (mainly mortgage banks and banks with special functions). They hold clearly more than a proportional fraction of all loans to this industry until about 1996. As a tentative explanation, the decrease in this fraction might be due to the ongoing privatisation of the Deutsche Telekom causing a substitution of borrowed capital through equity raised by the initial public offering in November 1996. 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B a n k s u . p . L a w C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s O t h e r B a n k s
Last but not least, since cooperative banks possess more than a proportional share in the agriculture, hunting and forestry industry, this has to be compensated in some other industries. Note that from this perspective the service industry is not a plausible candidate for that as might have been expected since this industry possesses a division across bank categories similar to a hypothetical division according to market shares. However, in the electricity, gas and water supply industry, for example, cooperative banks are significantly under-represented (see Figure 10 ). This industry is nearly constantly dominated by the category banks under public law. This may be due to large public utilities that have a financing bias towards likewise publicly owned banks.
Portfolio Analysis (Bank Sub-Categories)
In the remaining part of this section we will briefly examine each of the three bank categories in more detail. A summary of their distance measures' time series is given in table A.3 (few industries). However, this is only done in an illustrative, non-rigorous way. We present some interesting findings related to the behaviour of foreign banks in the German market and to the role of categories' central banks. Only the broad industry classification schema is applied, a choice which, again, is somewhat arbitrary.
Commercial Banks: According to all six measures, the distance of their loan portfolio structure to the loan market has decreased non-negligibly from 1970 to 2001 (cf. Tables A.1 as well as A.2). This is true, especially, for the difference in those industries where their absolute deviation was initially particularly large. Among the commercial banks, these results are nearly true for 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B ig B a n k s R e g io n a l B a n k s a n d o t h e r s B r a n c h e s o f F o r e ig n B a n k s all bank groups (sub-categories), i.e., big banks and regional banks and other commercial banks (see Table A .3 and, for example, Figure 11 ). For branches of foreign banks, however, the movement is far less clear. Considering absolute differences, the distance of this sub-category to the market increased over the whole sample horizon (D 3 nearly doubles according to γ CB 3 ), while strongly decreasing for the relative measures, as in Figure 11 . Maybe the chosen benchmark (German loan market portfolio) is inappropriate for these banks. Comparing the distances from the loan market portfolio of all three bank groups and the whole category, it turns out that the foreign banks are always for all average and weighted average measures (D 2 , D 3 , D 5 , D 6 ) further away from the loan market portfolio than the big banks.
17 These are still further away than the category as a whole (except a few times where D
Bof B 4
< D CB 4 ) , whereas the regional banks are closest to the loan market portfolio (compare Tables A .1 and A.3) . This is in some conflict with the intuition, suggesting that it is more difficult to diversify as a bank serving a limited region only. Yet one has to note that we are looking at the aggregate of all regional banks and therefore the limited possibility for diversification does not really apply.
Banks under Public Law: For all measures and in all years, these banks are closest (in absolute terms) to the loan market portfolio of all bank categories (cf. Table A.1). However, their loan portfolio shows still the most visible movements (in relative terms) towards the industry composition of the loan market portfolio (cf. Table A. 2). Within the category both groups, the savings and state banks, have decreased their distance from the loan market portfolio according to all three measures based on absolute differences, whereas savings banks increase their relative differences (see Table A .3 and, for example, Figure 12) . Examining, for example, Figure 12 it is also obvious that both sub categories (state as well as savings banks) slightly (if at all) increase their dis- 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 B a n k s u n d e r P u b lic L a w S t a t e B a n k s S a v in g s B a n k s tance to the loan market while internal diversification still reduces the overall (category) distance. Additionally, it is interesting to note, that the category exhibits internal diversification in the sense that the deviation from the loan market portfolio, according to all six measures, is least for the joint category, highest for the group of state banks, and with the savings banks being inbetween. Also, as noted earlier, the category as a whole approaches the loan market portfolio according to all measures although not all its groups do for measures based on relative differences. 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s R e g io n a l I n s t it u t io n s o f C r e d it C o o p e r a t iv e s C r e d it C o o p e r a t iv e s Table A .2) that cooperative banks either intend loan portfolio adjustment to a lesser extend than other categories or they simply do not have the possibility as much as others have. Noting cooperative banks never had a higher distance than the sub-categories' maximum distance for all measures and all years, we can infer that regional institutions improve category diversification (cf. Tables A.1/A.3 and Figure 13 ). This holds even if regional institutions are sometimes further away from the loan market portfolio than credit cooperatives (see, for example, Figure 13, [1977] [1978] [1979] .
Conclusions and Future Research
Our study examines the industry composition of German banks' corporate loan portfolios. From a theoretical perspective two plausible, competing hypotheses can be driven. On the one hand banks might try to diversify and duplicate the industry structure of the economy's total loan market portfolio; on the other hand they might try to specialise in certain industries. We analyse which of these hypotheses, if any, is supported by empirical data from 1970 to 2001 covering nearly all German banks (aggregated into 7 bank groups) and 16 industries, accounting for about 50% of all bank lending. We apply a methodology, the use of distance measures, which is a novel approach for the problem at hand. Six different indices are applied, measuring maximum, average, and weighted absolute and relative deviations of the industry shares in a bank's loan portfolio from the respective shares in the total loan market. These measures cover a fairly broad range of notions "how far" portfolios are apart from each other.
Given the diversity of indices, it is surprising to us that the analysis reveals a fairly clear confirmation of the market-orientation hypothesis for the bank categories. A tentative explanation could stress the significance of our use of aggregate data. It might, e.g., be the case that specialised banks are aggregated into groups such that the average is closer to the market. However, this reasoning, even if true for some instances, would not explain why a visible trend towards the total loan market portfolio exists over time.
The more disaggregate analysis of bank groups shows a less obvious but still present trend towards the market. It is interesting to note that among commercial banks the branches of foreign banks are the ones most distant from the market, which might confirm that an average industry composition within Germany is not their target. Within the categories of banks under public law and cooperative banks, the respective central institutions provide diversification for the local institutions (savings banks and credit cooperatives).
Our methodology also nicely applies for a different perspective. We can compare the distribution of loans across banks in some industry with the banks' shares in the whole market. It turns out that in a few sectors there are notable discrepancies, e.g., agriculture, hunting and forestry which is still dominated by cooperative banks (maybe for historical reasons) and electricity, gas and water supply where ownership structure and size are possible factors working in favour of banks under public law.
Like other empirical facts, our findings should be checked for robustness. There are a number of factors which could not be controlled for so far.
• Firstly, we try to assess banks' portfolio strategy without any kind of risk specification, like, for example the standard deviation of returns or the value at risk. This is of course questionable, but necessary since even neglecting data availability problems we still do not know which risk measure would be appropriate. Therefore, we decided just to examine the portfolio compositions.
• Secondly, our results are no statements of the banks' total portfolio (risk) allocation because bonds and other financial instruments such as shares and even credit derivatives are possibly used to adjust the industry distribution of loans towards a more or less diversified structure. This is problematic. But in our opinion, it is (up to now) too difficult to evaluate banks' illiquid (loan) portfolio combined with their liquid part since both are characterised by different transparency and market price availability. Our new methodology is, therefore, a useful way helping banks' to cope with the illiquid part of their portfolios, which are non-negligible (accounting for around 50% of banks' total lending to domestic non-banks).
• Thirdly, no account was made for loan size. Regulatory constraints and bank size combined may imply that some bank categories have more than proportional shares of loans in specific industries, where, e.g., firm size (and hence loan size) are particular large. Our methodology would be useful to compare banks' size distribution of loans, too, if the data were available.
Modifications to take into account these aspects might yield further interesting insights. This was also true if we could apply our methodology to individual banks.
There is a final point we want to stress. We have observed a distinct trend towards the market. It is tempting to say, but not justified by our present analysis, that these adjustments were made on purpose. On an aggregate level, there is no apparent reason for joint, coordinated behaviour of commercial banks; the situation for banks under public law and cooperative banks is probably different. Anyway, a different approach was needed to prove that (individual) banks try to adjust the industry composition to the industries' loan market shares. For instance, by means of causality tests (cf. Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) ) one could try to retrieve banks' objectives. However, such an analysis is well beyond the scope of this explorative study and even the statistic definition of causality does not necessarily has to coincide with a philosopher's (cf., for example, Schwert (1979) and Zellner (1979) ). 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 C o m m e r c ia l B a n k s B a n k s u . p . L a w C o o p e r a t iv e B a n k s = Development over whole sample in percentage according to regression; RC = Rank correlation coefficient (with distance-to-date) = Development over whole sample in percentage according to regression
A Appendix
D 1 D 2 D 3 D 4 D 5 D 6 Commercial
